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1 Introduction
Temporary short-term loans, such as checking account overdrafts or payday credit, are
double-edged swords: while easy access to such credit may help individuals make ends meet
when faced with shocks (Morse, 2011; Islam and Maitra, 2012), there is also a risk that
high-cost debt triggers further financial distress (Melzer, 2011) and draws people into debt
cycles. The risk of negative consequences is particularly acute when individuals exhibit be-
havioral biases like hyperbolic discounting, which could lead individuals to continuously put
off paying down high-cost debt in order to enjoy more consumption in the present (Angeletos
et al., 2001). When agents are time inconsistent, there is scope for financial products that
offer commitment to restrict current spending and improve long-run welfare.
Yet the success of commitment in such a context is by no means assured: individuals
who are (partially) naïve about their self-control problem may not sign up, or sign up for
too little commitment (Laibson, 2015). Furthermore, individuals who do choose to commit
may take costly measures to undo their commitments in the future. This could take the
form of drawing down other savings, paying fees to opt out of the commitment product, or
taking on additional debt to support current-period consumption. Ultimately, assessing the
extent to which commitment products increase welfare and build net savings is an empirical
question. Given the risk that commitment crowds out other savings or crowds in debt, it
is particularly important to collect comprehensive data on consumer balance sheets when
evaluating commitment products – yet rigorous evaluations that do this are surprisingly rare,
especially in developing country contexts.1
We conducted a randomized trial with salaried workers in Ghana to fill this evidence
gap and shed light on whether commitment has the potential to lift individuals out of debt
cycles. All the workers had access to an overdraft facility on the bank account linked to
their salary payments, and many made regular use of the facility at a substantial cost. Half
the workers were randomly offered a novel savings product that automatically deducted
a pre-specified savings contribution from their monthly paycheck. The contribution cycle
lasted for 18 months, after which all contributions, plus a “completion bonus” equal to one
month’s contribution, were released to the saver. Workers faced a penalty if they withdrew
any money before the end of 18 months. The product was designed with debt cycles in mind:
by building up a sizable lump sum with the partner bank, users could release themselves
from an overdraft debt cycle at the end of the commitment period.
1Accounting for crowd out is important, as even the very poor typically have access to some type of
liquidity (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007; Collins et al., 2009). Note that access to liquidity in and of itself is not
a sign that commitment will fail, especially when individuals have precautionary savings motives – in this
case, people can be pushed to a corner before drawing down their liquidity (Laibson, 1997).
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We combine administrative data from the bank with six waves of detailed survey data
to study how commitment impacted respondents’ financial behavior – both at the partner
bank and more broadly. First, we find robust demand for commitment. Seventy-two percent
of individuals in the treatment group signed up for the product, and just 13 percent of those
who signed up dropped out before the 18-month savings cycle ended. Second, the product
more than doubled balances at the partner bank both during and after the commitment
period. We also observe a marginally significant 6 percentage point (18 percent) decline in
overdrafts in the six months following the release of the commitment amount. In the longer
run, however, treatment effects on overdrafts disappear.
Our third main result underscores the importance of taking a broader view of consumers’
finances when evaluating savings products. Although the commitment product did not crowd
out other cash savings, we do observe a significant increase in the share of respondents who
took on new debt during the commitment period. Point estimates on debt stocks are roughly
equal to point estimates on total savings, and as a result our treatment estimates on net
savings (savings less debt) are close to zero and not statistically significant.
This interpretation changes dramatically when studying heterogeneity in treatment ef-
fects by baseline overdrafter status, however. “Heavy overdrafters” (those with above median
overdraft histories at baseline) did save more at the partner bank during the commitment
period, but this treatment effect disappears after the commitment amount is released. More-
over, the product significantly decreased heavy overdrafters’ other formal sector savings dur-
ing the commitment period while increasing the rate of debt taking. These results are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that heavy overdrafters are naïve hyperbolic discounters, who
end up undoing their commitment by borrowing. “Light overdrafters” (those with below-
median histories) exhibited a very different response: the commitment product significantly
increased other formal sector savings both during and after the commitment period, with no
significant impact on debt. This suggests that light overdrafters benefited from the savings
product through a channel other than time inconsistency.
The main contribution of our paper is to explore the extent to which commitment is
crowded out by other sources of liquidity, while directly exploring the pitfalls of commitment.
To date, much of the research on behavioral savings products in development economics
focuses on savings held at partner financial institutions, or savings without accounting for
debt (for a review of recent work see Karlan et al. 2014). Our findings highlight the need for
future work to cast a broader net when assessing the promise of commitment for improving
the financial lives of the poor.2 Our work also builds on John (2017), who finds that over
2In this way our paper is related to a growing literature that seeks to understand the net effects of
retirement savings programs in developed country contexts (Poterba et al., 1996; Benjamin, 2003; Engelhardt
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half of individuals who sign up for a similar contribution-based commitment product end up
paying a fee to drop out early. We go beyond this to show that negative effects need not be
limited to program dropout – in our case, agents turn to debt to offset savings commitments,
which is costly and runs the risk of propagating debt cycles. We also demonstrate that
negative side effects are concentrated among people who exhibit behavior most consistent
with self-control problems at baseline. This suggests that when individuals are naïve about
the extent of their self-control problem, commitment may do more harm than good.
Another contribution of our paper is to show that illiquid savings products can improve
individuals’ financial lives for reasons unrelated to a direct commitment effect. Here, our
work relates to Brune et al. (2016), who find that a commitment savings product increased
savings, agricultural investment, agricultural output, and consumption of Malawian farmers
even though amounts actually committed were quite low. We build on this by showing that
benefits accrue to individuals least likely to be liquidity constrained, and by showing that
the commitment product crowds in other savings both during and after the commitment
period.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: We first describe our sample and the
experiment in Section 2. We present our results in Section 3, which includes an analysis
of overall impacts, heterogeneity by baseline overdraft status, and discussion. Section 4
concludes.
2 Experimental Context and Design
2.1 Partner Bank and Study Sample
The study sample is comprised of 320 salaried workers receiving electronic salary payments
into bank accounts at the North Volta Rural Bank (NVRB).3 NVRB is a small bank that
mostly serves individuals living in rural areas, where the majority of economically active
individuals are self-employed in agriculture (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013).
By virtue of being salaried workers, our sample is better off than the average citizen in the
bank’s catchment area. Column 1 of Appendix Table A1 illustrates baseline characteristics
in the control group: three-quarters of study participants were men, two-thirds had a post-
secondary education, and 90 percent were government employees, with teacher the most
common occupation.4 In comparison, across Ghana and in the Volta Region, approximately
and Kumar, 2007; Gelber, 2011; Chetty et al., 2014; Beshears et al., 2017).
3Appendix A provides additional detail on sampling and inclusion/exclusion criteria.
4The remaining 10 percent of workers are NVRB employees. Our results are unchanged if we drop these
individuals from the analysis.
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6 percent of the economically active population is employed by the government and just 8
percent of individuals aged 15 and older have a post-secondary education (Ghana Statistical
Service, 2013, 2012). Our respondents reported an average monthly income of GHS 770,
or $358 at a 2013 exchange rate of GHS 2.15 per $1, had GHS 240-250 in savings with
NVRB, and GHS 1,628 in cash savings across all sources.5 Although our respondents have
desirable jobs, they are still economically vulnerable: one-third of the respondents reported
that children in their care miss school due to late school fees “often” or “sometimes”, 71
percent reported that they often or sometimes worry about having enough money to pay
monthly bills, and 61 percent stated that they are “socially taxed”, in that they often or
sometimes have difficulty saying no to requests from others.
Salaried workers are valuable bank customers in Ghana. Regularly-recurring salary pay-
ments allow banks to reliably deduct loan fees, interest, and principal directly from the
customer’s account, and bank accounts offering salary advances or overdraft facilities to cus-
tomers who receive electronic payments are common. At NVRB, salaried customers may
receive an overdraft by completing a requisition form at the bank branch. NVRB then per-
mits the customer to take a cash withdrawal equal to the overdraft amount, which turns
the customer’s bank balance negative. At the time of the experiment, overdrafts incurred
a fixed GHS 5 service fee plus a variable fee equal to 18 percent of the overdraft amount.
Since most overdrafts are cleared in less than one month, these loans have exceptionally high
effective interest rates.6 Workers in our sample made extensive use of overdrafts at baseline:
Fifty-eight percent of respondents overdrafted at least once in the year before baseline, with
the average overdrafter paying GHS 226 ($105) in fees and interest over the same period.
Appendix Figure A1 graphs the distribution of overdrafts.
Individuals who use costly, short-term credit are particularly likely to have time incon-
sistency problems (Meier and Sprenger, 2010; Gathergood, 2012). As such, we stratified
our randomization by baseline overdrafting behavior (as well as gender and bank branch)
because we were interested in studying heterogeneity in treatment effects by overdrafter sta-
tus.7 Before randomizing we constructed an index of overdrafting behavior and defined those
5Total baseline cash savings include savings at NVRB, savings at other banks, microfinance institutions,
and credit unions, savings with group savings clubs, savings with agricultural co-ops, savings held by susu
collectors, money lenders, other individuals, and cash kept at home.
6Seventy-six percent of the overdrafts taken out by our study sample were cleared within 31 days and 90
percent were cleared in 93 days. As a matter of policy, NVRB only formally approves overdrafts for one or
two months.
7The baseline survey also asked respondents to make hypothetical choices between different amounts of
money at different times, but there were only two opportunities for respondents to make a quasi-hyperbolic
preference reversal and choices were unincentivized. In practice, just 3.8 percent of respondents made two
reversals, while 20 percent of respondents made one reversal. Given the weaknesses of the survey-based
measure, we do not use it in the main analysis and instead focus on heterogeneity in overdrafting behavior.
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with an above-median score to be “heavy overdrafters”.8
Table 1 illustrates differences in baseline characteristics by overdrafter status. The first
row shows that, on average, light overdrafters only took an overdraft in 6 percent of the
months in the year prior to the baseline, while heavy overdrafters were in overdraft more
than 50 percent of the time. Heavy overdrafters were more likely to be men, more likely
to be teachers, less likely to work in the private sector, and had more children and lived in
larger households. Although they had similar incomes to light overdrafters, they reported
roughly GHS 400 less in savings and GHS 1,200 more in total debt and were 12 percentage
points more likely to report difficulty paying bills.
2.2 Experimental Design
NVRB worked with the research team to design a new savings product called Salary Susu
Plus (SSP) for the purposes of the study. Similar services were not offered by other banks
in the study area at the time. SSP participants specified a monthly contribution amount,
which would be deducted from future salary deposits for a period of 18 months. The monthly
contribution had to be equal to at least GHS 30 and could not be changed after it was set.
Customers could not access their contributions during the savings cycle unless they opted
out of the program at a cost of one month’s contribution. Customers who completed the
commitment cycle received all their contributions plus an additional bonus payment equal to
one month’s contribution (or 5.6 percent of the total contribution amount). This amounts
to an annual percentage yield (APY) of 7 percent, assuming monthly compounding. By
way of comparison, NVRB offered no interest on current accounts and a 3 percent APY on
savings accounts at the time of the baseline. While SSP offered an attractive rate of return
relative to NVRB’s other offerings, the real return on savings was still negative, since annual
inflation ranged from 10-19 percent over the course of our study period (Bank of Ghana,
2014, 2017).
Half the sample in each overdrafter×branch×gender stratum was assigned to the treat-
ment group, which was offered the opportunity to sign up for SSP. Appendix Table A1 con-
firms that baseline characteristics are balanced across treatment and control groups, both
overall and when the sample is split by overdrafter status.
Appendix Figure A2 illustrates the timeline of all study activities. SSP debits began in
8Overdraft scores were constructed for each person using their current account transaction records avail-
able at the time of the randomization. The score was calculated as the fraction of balance entries that were
negative over the life of the account. The sample was sorted from lowest score (never had a negative balance)
to highest (negative balance 66 percent of the time).
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December 2013, continued through May 2015, and payouts were made to SSP clients in June
2015.9
2.3 Data
Our analysis combines administrative data from NVRB with six waves of survey data. The
administrative data contain information on all transactions posted to respondents’ NVRB
accounts from the time of account opening to one year after the end of the intervention (32
months after baseline).
The baseline took place before SSP was introduced. The first three follow-ups took place
while SSP was ongoing – during program months 6, 10, and 14. The objective of these
rounds was to collect data on savings and debt during the commitment period, and assess
how commitment impacted expenditure. The last two follow-ups took place 3 and 5 months
after the SSP payout. These surveys were designed to assess how respondents’ financial lives
had changed after the commitment amount was released.10
In total, 91 percent of study participants participated in all survey rounds and 98 percent
of study participants participated in at least one follow-up survey round. Appendix Table
A2 verifies that attrition is uncorrelated with treatment status.
3 Main Results
3.1 Take Up
Seventy-two percent of individuals in the treatment group signed up for SSP. The median
monthly contribution was GHS 30, while the average contribution was GHS 42. Completion
rates were also high, with just 13 percent of respondents who signed up for SSP dropping
out before the savings cycle was over. Appendix Table A3 studies correlates of take-up (in
the treatment group) and dropout (among those in the treatment group who signed up).
The first two columns study pairwise correlations between take-up/dropout and baseline
characteristics, while the last two columns present results of regressions where all baseline
9All study participants – in both the treatment and the control group – who did not have a savings
account with NVRB were given the opportunity to open one in May 2015. Treatment group individuals
were significantly more likely to open a savings account, largely because the bank stated to customers that
SSP deposits were meant to be sent to a savings account. As a result the treatment group had 0.45 more
accounts with NVRB than the control group by endline. This should be kept in mind when interpreting
treatment effects in the post-intervention period.
10Additional details on each survey round, including timing, participation, and modules contained, can be
found in Appendix A.
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characteristics are entered simultaneously. SSP had broad appeal, with few baseline char-
acteristics predicting take-up and dropout. Strikingly, while heavy overdrafters were just as
likely as light overdrafters to sign up for SSP, they were 12 percentage points more likely to
drop out (column 2). This is consistent with the hypothesis that some heavy overdrafters
are partially-naïve and underestimate their future desire to undo commitments.
3.2 Direct Effects: Results from Administrative Data
We now analyze how SSP impacted study participants’ use of NVRB accounts. Here, we
focus on use of overdrafts, overdraft fees paid, net deposits (total deposits minus total debits,
a measure of savings flow), and the average daily account balance (a measure of savings
stock).11 Our administrative data span the commitment period, the post-commitment period
covered by follow-up surveys, and a post-commitment, post-survey period. We therefore
estimate separate treatment effects for these three periods to understand how effects evolve
over time.12 We use the following regression specification:
yit = β1treati× duringt + β2treati× after1t + β3treati× after2t + β4yi0 + γs + δt + εit (1)
Where yit is the outcome of interest for account holder i in month t, treati is a dummy variable
equal to one if account holder i is in the treatment group, duringt identifies the commitment
period, after1t identifies the post-commitment, follow-up survey period, after2t identifies
the post-commitment, post-survey period, γs are strata fixed effects, δt are month fixed
effects, and yi0 is the average outcome of interest, measured in the year before the survey.
The first two columns of Table 2 show that during the commitment period SSP had no
impact on overdrafts. After SSP savings were released, the share of accounts in overdraft
declined by 6 percentage points (18 percent), while overdraft charges declined by GHS 3.77
(21 percent) per month – both significant at the 10 percent level. In the longer run, however,
participants slid back into debt cycles: we find no treatment effect on overdrafts 7-12 months
after the commitment amount was released.
During the commitment period, SSP increased net deposits by GHS 19.5 (column 3 of
Table 2). The 72 percent takeup rate implies a treatment-on-the-treated effect of GHS 27,
roughly two-thirds of the average SSP contribution of GHS 42 – thus, there is evidence
that participants were able to partially undo their commitments by drawing down other
11When constructing variables we sum across all accounts each respondent holds with NVRB. Note that
average daily balances can be negative, e.g. when an account holder takes an overdraft.
12The commitment period lasted from December 2013 to May 2015, the post-commitment, follow-up
survey period covered June to November 2015, and the post-commitment, post-survey period covers six
months from December 2015 to May 2016.
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savings at NVRB. Column 3 also shows that the treatment effect on net deposits dropped
to zero during the follow-up, post-commitment period. This is not surprising, since many
participants withdrew their SSP savings during this period. Interestingly, in the post-survey,
post-commitment period the treatment effect on net deposits (GHS 32.5) exceeds the com-
mitment period treatment effect. This suggests that SSP had persistent effects on savings
behavior at NVRB, subject to the caveat that the point estimate is not significantly different
from zero.
Finally, column 4 shows that SSP generated a significant and highly persistent increase
in NVRB balances: the average daily balance during the commitment period increased by
GHS 244, and remained GHS 140-141 higher during the two post-commitment periods.
These treatment effects are large relative to control groups means ranging from GHS 90-111
across the three focal time periods.
3.3 Overall Effects: Results from Survey Data
We now turn to the survey data to assess whether impacts on NVRB balances reflect new
savings or crowd out. We use a regression specification that mirrors equation 1, except t
now references survey round, the interaction between treatment and the post-commitment,
post-survey period is dropped, and yi0 references values measured at the baseline survey.
The first two columns of Table 3 present treatment effects on NVRB savings. The first
column uses the same administrative data used in the earlier section, but focuses on NVRB
savings on the day of the relevant survey. In order to make the measure comparable with
survey reports, negative NVRB account balances are coded as zero NVRB savings. The
second column studies savings based on respondent self-reports. Both variables paint a
similar picture: SSP more than doubled NVRB savings during the commitment period.
The administrative data also show a marginally significant impact on NVRB savings in the
post-commitment period, while the point estimate for the survey data is smaller and not
significantly different from zero. Columns 3 and 4 show that SSP had no significant impact
on other formal or informal savings.
Individuals may also offset commitments by taking on more debt. Columns 6 and 7 of
Table 3 study SSP’s impacts on debt.13 Here, we find a significant, 7.6 percentage point (40
percent) increase in the likelihood of taking on new debt during the commitment period.
This could reflect increased financial strain driven by the regular monthly commitment.14
Recall that we do not see any parallel impacts on the overdraft rate or overdraft fees at
13Appendix Table A4 shows impacts on debt by source.
14We do not, however, find that SSP increased self-reported markers of financial strain, like food insecurity
and difficulty paying bills (Appendix Table A5).
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NVRB during the commitment period (Table 2). This could be for one of two reasons:
either marginal debtors have access to cheaper forms of credit than overdrafts, or marginal
debtors are already maxed out on overdrafts.
While the effect of SSP on the debt stock is not significantly different from zero, the point
estimate is economically meaningful and very close in magnitude to the treatment effect on
savings. As a result, we find no evidence that SSP increased savings net of debt (Table 3,
column 8). One caveat here is that our survey-based estimates – while close to zero – are
noisy. The 95 percent confidence interval for the impact of SSP on savings net debt easily
includes the analogous point estimate on savings with NVRB.
3.4 Heterogeneity by Baseline Overdrafting
The main effects mask strikingly different treatment effects by baseline overdrafter status.
This can be seen in Figure 1, which graphs monthly treatment effects on the average daily
balance at NVRB by overdrafter status. Here, the first vertical dashed line demarcates the
payout month and the second vertical line demarcates the end of survey coverage. Panel
B shows that the treatment effect for heavy overdrafters peaked roughly six months before
the SSP payout. This could reflect a combination of program dropout (19 percent of heavy
overdrafters dropped out early, as compared to 7 percent of light overdrafters) and draw-
down of liquid, non-committed NVRB balances. In contrast, the treatment effect for light
overdrafters peaked the month before the payout (Panel A). Moreover, treatment effects for
light overdrafters re-emerge in the post-endline period after dropping immediately after com-
mitment amounts are released. These patterns are consistent with the hypothesis that light
overdrafters became accustomed to making smaller withdrawals from their NVRB accounts
and continued with this behavior after the SSP program ended.15
These stark differences in treatment effects by baseline overdraft behavior are also ap-
parent in the survey data. We examine heterogeneous treatment effects by augmenting
equation 1 to include interactions between the different treatment effects and either a “heavy
overdrafter” (above median overdraft score at baseline) or “light overdrafter” (below me-
dian overdraft score) dummy.16 Table 4 shows that during the commitment period, light
overdrafters saved more both with NVRB and with other banks and credit unions – com-
mitment crowded additional savings into the banking sector. While there is some crowd out
of informal savings during the commitment period, the point estimate is small compared to
treatment effects on formal savings. Consequently, we reject the null of no impact on total
15In contrast, treatment effects on overdrafts are similar for the two groups – see Appendix Table A6 for
detail.
16We also include interactions between overdrafter status and time period.
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savings at the 5 percent level, both during and after the commitment period. The point
estimates for both periods are just short of GHS 600, very close to total program savings of
the median SSP participant (GHS 570).
In contrast, heavy overdrafters saved significantly less in other formal sector accounts,
more than offsetting the additional savings stored with NVRB – as a result, point estimates
on total savings are negative and not statistically significant. We reject equality of treatment
effects on total savings for heavy and light overdrafters at the 1 percent level both during
and after the commitment period.
Columns 6-8 of Table 4 show that this heterogeneity persists when accounting for debt.
Only heavy overdrafters took on significantly more debt during the commitment period. As
a result, treatment effects on savings net debt are large and negative for heavy overdrafters,
while treatment effects on savings net debt are similar to treatment effects on total savings
for light overdrafters. Here, we reject equality of effects by overdrafter status at the 5 percent
level during and after the commitment period.
Given that SSP helped light overdrafters save more without taking on new debt, where
did the additional money come from? Appendix Table A8 presents impacts on income and
expenditure. Given the modest monthly changes needed to generate our point estimates, we
cannot definitively identify consumption or income as the source of the new savings, although
We do find some significant survey-based evidence that light overdrafters in the treatment
group earn more. We view this result with caution, as we only collected income data in
one follow-up survey. Table A8 also helps rule out the hypothesis that heavy overdrafters
leverage SSP payouts and new debt to make lumpy investments in the post-commitment
period: SSP had no significant impact on investment for either group.
3.5 Mechanisms and Discussion
Overall, our results for heavy overdrafters are consistent with a model of partially-naïve
hyperbolic discounting, e.g. where workers sign up for SSP expecting that it will help with
their commitment problems, but fail to account for the fact that they will resort to costly
borrowing to undo their commitment in the future. The behavior of light overdrafters is
more difficult to rationalize. What is clear is that their response to SSP is not consistent
with standard models of hyperbolic discounting, where savings outside SSP should weakly
decrease during the commitment period. How, then, did SSP catalyze savings among light
overdrafters?
One possibility is that SSP helped light overdrafters manage financial demands from
extended family or community members. This type of “other control” problem could be
11
particularly important in our context, where salaried workers are often asked to support less
well-off relatives – recall that roughly 60 percent of our sample reported difficulty saying no
to requests from others at baseline. In theory, SSP could have had a direct effect on transfer
requests, e.g. if SSP reduced liquidity available for transfers, and an indirect effect, e.g. if
signing up for SSP gave respondents an accepted justification to deny transfer requests. In
practice, the indirect channel is needed to explain our results for light overdrafters, given
that the treatment crowds in other formal sector savings and that treatment effects persist
into the post-commitment period. We find no strong evidence that other control is driving
heterogeneity by overdrafter status: Appendix Table A8 shows that the treatment had no
significant effect on money spent on others, and heterogeneity by other control does not
mirror heterogeneity by overdrafter status (Appendix Table A9).
Alternatively, psychological mechanisms could have catalyzed the SSP treatment effects
for light overdrafters. For example, the product may have helped light overdrafters build
better savings habits – the fact that treated light overdrafters continued to save more with
NVRB after withdrawing the SSP lump sum is consistent with this channel. A related
hypothesis is that SSP helped individuals “learn” how to save, or helped them learn that
saving was less difficult than they initially thought. The spillover effects on other types of
saving are consistent with these theories, which could transition individuals to an entirely
new savings equilibrium (Becker and Murphy, 1988).
An alternative way to rationalize crowd in would be if individuals have lumpy savings
goals with high returns/marginal utility (e.g. a business asset or a high-value durable good
like a vehicle), but there is some uncertainty over whether the savings goal can be met. If
SSP increased the probability of reaching the savings goal, this could increase the return
to saving in other places as well. We do have some suggestive evidence that SSP helped
respondents reach savings goals. First, 69 percent of people who signed up for SSP reported
that they did so with a specific goal in mind. Second, experience with SSP led participants
to positively update their assessment of the product’s usefulness for meeting goals.
Appendix Table A10 reports on how treatment impacted respondents’ post-commitment
assessments of SSP, both overall and by baseline overdrafter status.17 In the control group,
21 percent of respondents strongly agreed that SSP would help to meet savings goals and
19 percent of respondents strongly agreed SSP would help build money for a large expense.
Assignment to the treatment group increased these assessments by 14 and 19 percentage
17In our final survey round, we asked all respondents whether they thought SSP was useful for a range of
purposes. SSP users answered based on their experience, while the control group had the product explained
to them and were then asked to speculate as to whether the product would be useful for the given purposes.
Here we focus on the share of respondents who “strongly agree” that SSP helps with a given aim, since the
default response for most respondents was “agree”.
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points respectively, with similar effects for both heavy and light overdrafters. SSP also
significantly increased the share of individuals who strongly agreed that the product helps
manage transfer requests from people within the household (column 1) – this is broadly
consistent with results in Appendix Table A9.
However, we cannot reject the null that the effects in Appendix Table A10 are the same
for heavy and light overdrafters. Why are effects on downstream outcomes so different by
overdrafter status when perceived benefits of the product are so similar? One possibility is
that differential treatment effects are not driven by underlying behavioral mechanisms so
much as they are driven by differences in financial fundamentals. Consider, for example,
the “lumpy savings goal” hypothesis: in order for SSP to have an impact on the likelihood
of meeting a savings goal, a saver’s baseline probability of meeting a goal would have to be
neither too low nor too high. It may be that light overdrafters, by virtue of being in a better
savings position to begin with, were more likely to be marginal savers.
Ultimately, data constraints prevent us from testing the hypotheses discussed in this
section more directly – we therefore leave further investigation of these questions to future
research.
4 Conclusion
We use six rounds of detailed survey data as well as administrative bank data to study the
impact of a commitment savings product for salaried workers in Ghana. Overall, the product
increased savings at the partner bank, both during and after the commitment period, with
limited crowd out of cash savings held in other places. These savings gains are offset by an
increase in debt – as a result, the point estimate on net savings is small and insignificant.
This suggests that people with access to liquidity may fail to benefit from commitment
savings products because they can undo their commitment with other financial instruments.
However, we find divergent results when we examine heterogeneity in treatment effects
by baseline propensity to take overdrafts with our partner bank. Heavy overdrafters – who
had less liquid savings and more debt at baseline – see (marginally significant) declines in
net savings when offered the product, while light overdrafters – who had considerably better
access to liquidity – save more, both with the partner bank and in other savings devices,
and do not take on more debt. Strikingly, these treatment effects manifest both during and
after the commitment period.
Our results for heavy overdrafters are consistent with the hypothesis that time incon-
sistent agents make inefficient savings commitments, especially when they have access to
liquidity that allows them to unwind their commitments. The results for light overdrafters
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present a much bigger puzzle, especially because commitment crowded in liquid savings
during the commitment period. Although optimally chosen commitment can increase the
savings of time inconsistent agents, theory predicts that this will be at the expense of liquid-
ity held elsewhere. Hence, our light overdrafter results underscore that commitment savings
products can benefit consumers for reasons unrelated to time inconsistency.
What remains less clear is why commitment products benefit savers for other reasons.
While we cannot isolate a single mechanism for our effects, we do identify several potential
channels, including habit formation and learning. Ultimately, additional research is needed to
explore the multiple pathways through which illiquid savings products transform individuals’
financial lives.
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Table 1: Demographic Differences By Baseline Overdrafter Status
(1) (2) (3)
Light
Overdrafter
Mean
Heavy-
Light
Difference N
Fraction Months in Overdraft: Past Year 0.0578 0.481∗∗∗ 318
[0.141] (0.0242)
Female 0.3 -.129∗∗∗ 318
[0.46] (0.0472)
Age 45.5 4.53∗∗∗ 318
[9.63] (0.945)
Teacher 0.469 0.202∗∗∗ 318
[0.501] (0.0545)
Other Govt. Employee 0.35 -.0272 318
[0.478] (0.0531)
Formal Private Sector Worker 0.188 -.181∗∗∗ 318
[0.392] (0.0316)
Education: Secondary Graduate 0.344 -.0526 318
[0.476] (0.0523)
Education: Postsecondary 0.606 0.0583 318
[0.49] (0.054)
Married 0.85 0.0487 318
[0.358] (0.0372)
Biological Children Ever Born 3.14 1.32∗∗∗ 318
[2.1] (0.252)
Householders 14 and Under 2.15 -.0677 318
[1.73] (0.19)
Householders 15 and Older 3.5 0.69∗∗∗ 318
[2.04] (0.237)
Income Last Month 729 15.4 302
[372] (45.3)
Savings - NVRB (Reported) 324 -186∗∗∗ 283
[612] (58.9)
Savings - NVRB (Adminstrative) 356 -243∗∗∗ 318
[699] (63.2)
Total Cash Savings 1672 -399 249
[3249] (358)
Total Debt 1930 1252∗∗∗ 308
[2428] (329)
Economic Shock 0.481 0.0377 318
[0.501] (0.0562)
Financial Strain: Missed School 0.313 -.00237 318
[0.465] (0.0521)
Financial Strain: Pay Bills 0.675 0.116∗∗ 318
[0.47] (0.0493)
Financial Strain: Pay Debt 0.563 0.0957∗ 318
[0.498] (0.0546)
Socially Taxed 0.619 -.0301 318
[0.487] (0.055)
Any Food Insecurity 0.444 0.0562 318
[0.498] (0.0561)
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
in parentheses. All variables denominated in Ghanaian Cedis top-coded at the 99th
percentile. In 2013 GHS 2.15 ≈ USD 1. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table 2: Impacts on NVRB Account Use, Administrative Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acct. in
Over-
draft
Overdraft
Charges
Net
Deposits
Average
Daily
Balance
Treatment × During 0.0095 0.55 19.5∗∗ 243.5∗∗∗
(0.020) (1.36) (8.11) (43.9)
Treatment × Endline -0.060∗ -3.77∗ -3.96 140.4∗∗
(0.032) (2.17) (26.7) (63.2)
Treatment × Post-Endline -0.0056 -0.55 32.5 141.2∗
(0.030) (2.36) (23.2) (84.1)
Control Mean (During) 0.30 16.3 -19.3 89.0
Control Mean (Endline) 0.33 18.3 1.99 110.1
Control Mean (Post-Endline) 0.26 17.5 18.8 110.6
N 9540 9540 9540 9540
Baseline Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions control for strata and month fixed effects as well as the average
outcome in the year before the baseline survey. Robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level in parentheses. Data is at the person-month level. Overdrafter
is a dummy equal to one if the participant paid either overdraft interest or the fee
for an overdraft form in a given month. Monthly overdrafter charges topcoded at
the 99th percentile, average daily balance topcoded at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Net deposit is the difference between total deposits and withdrawals, both topcoded
at the 99th percentile. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table 3: Impacts on Total Cash Savings, Debt, and Savings Net Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Savings Debt
Savings
at NVRB
(Admin)
Savings
at NVRB
(Survey)
Other
Formal
Savings
Informal
Savings
Total
Savings
Took Any
New Debt
Total
Debt
Savings
Net Debt
Treatment × During 303.1∗∗∗ 288.2∗∗∗ -47.7 -20.7 215.1 0.076∗∗∗ 283.3 -82.9
(43.7) (42.0) (118.1) (22.3) (139.4) (0.029) (283.3) (346.5)
Treatment × After 91.3∗ 25.0 127.5 2.57 145.0 0.046 195.1 1.38
(52.8) (49.3) (142.6) (45.6) (167.7) (0.031) (269.1) (354.6)
Control Mean (During) 164.6 214.2 979.9 172.9 1377.4 0.19 3080.8 -1687.8
Control Mean (After) 199.5 256.7 921.1 236.2 1424.1 0.15 2636.7 -1244.9
N 1528 1499 1518 1527 1488 1528 1519 1481
Baseline Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions include strata fixed effects, time period fixed effects, and the baseline outcome of the dependent variable whenever
possible. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Administrative NVRB savings is the balance on the
relevant survey day, with negative balances coded to zero. All variables in Ghanain Cedis top coded at the 99th percentile. In 2013
GHS 2.15 ≈ USD 1. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table 4: Impacts on Total Cash Savings, Debt, and Savings Net Debt - Heterogeneity by Baseline Overdraft Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Savings Debt
Savings
at NVRB
(Admin)
Savings
at NVRB
(Survey)
Other
Formal
Savings
Informal
Savings
Total
Savings
Took Any
New Debt
Total
Debt
Savings
Net Debt
Treatment × During × Light Overdrafter 322.4∗∗∗ 326.6∗∗∗ 341.7∗∗ -81.2∗∗ 573.8∗∗∗ 0.043 72.5 621.8
(76.8) (71.4) (166.5) (36.4) (200.2) (0.028) (369.9) (471.3)
Treatment × After × Light Overdrafter 101.2 54.7 567.3∗∗∗ -8.97 596.4∗∗ 0.021 -76.5 794.4∗
(97.4) (85.7) (205.1) (63.9) (242.9) (0.036) (338.1) (459.1)
Treatment × During × Heavy Overdrafter 284.2∗∗∗ 251.2∗∗∗ -428.6∗∗∗ 38.7 -136.6 0.11∗∗ 492.6 -776.1
(43.0) (46.8) (158.6) (26.1) (185.8) (0.050) (426.0) (472.2)
Treatment × After × Heavy Overdrafter 81.0∗∗ -4.04 -312.0∗ 15.3 -297.4 0.069 463.3 -771.4
(39.4) (51.8) (186.9) (65.9) (221.5) (0.051) (418.0) (499.4)
P-value: Heavy=Light, During 0.665 0.382 0.001∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.253 0.456 0.031∗∗
P-value: Heavy=Light, After 0.847 0.561 0.002∗∗∗ 0.793 0.006∗∗∗ 0.437 0.316 0.017∗∗
P-value: Treat=0, Light 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.079∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.308 0.892 0.221
P-value: Treat=0, Heavy 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.333 0.406 0.060∗ 0.440 0.195
Control Mean (During, Light) 292.1 293.2 780.2 234.1 1311.7 0.081 2552.9 -1257.1
Control Mean (After, Light) 336.7 349.4 731.2 246.9 1328.1 0.088 2322.0 -989.5
Control Mean (During, Heavy) 42.0 137.9 1174.4 113.9 1442.0 0.29 3590.2 -2114.5
Control Mean (After, Heavy) 65.9 165.3 1105.9 225.7 1518.8 0.20 2943.2 -1496.9
N 1528 1499 1518 1527 1488 1528 1519 1481
Baseline Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions include strata fixed effects, time period fixed effects, interactions between overdrafter status and time period, and the baseline outcome
of the dependent variable whenever possible. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Administrative NVRB savings is the
balance on the relevant survey day, with negative balances coded to zero. All variables in Ghanain Cedis top coded at the 99th percentile. In 2013 GHS 2.15
≈ USD 1. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Figure 1: Administrative Data – Impact on NVRB Balance by Month and Overdrafter Status
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Notes: Whiskers give 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals on estimates.
Average monthly balance is top-coded at the 99 percent level by month.
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A Appendix
A.1 Sampling
NVRB is a small bank, with eight branches in five districts serving roughly 10,000 account
holders at the time of the experiment.18 We attempted to enroll all workers who received
electronic salary payments into an NVRB account. Of the 420 workers we approached, 320
met our inclusion criteria and were willing to participate in the study. Workers were excluded
if (a) their electronic payments were not salaries (e.g. pension recipients), (b) they expected
to retire over the study duration, (c) they expected to move out of the study area, or (d)
they had all deposits to the NVRB account immediately transferred to another bank. Of
the 100 individuals from the initial list who were not included in the study sample, 63 met
one of the exclusion criteria, 10 were on chronic sick bed or mentally ill, 3 were deceased,
and 24 were not interested in participating in the study.
Half of individuals enrolled in the study were offered the opportunity to sign up for SSP.
We stratified the randomization by heavy overdrafter×branch×gender, which generated 28
distinct strata. The heavy overdrafter dummy was constructed by first creating an index of
overdrafting behavior. Overdraft scores were constructed for each person using their current
account transaction records available at the time of the randomization. The score was
calculated as the fraction of balance entries that were negative over the life of the account.
The sample was sorted from lowest score (never had a negative balance) to highest (negative
balance 66 percent of the time), with the top 50 percent of the sample classified as “heavy
overdrafters”.
A.2 Data Collection
Appendix Figure A2 shows the study timeline. In April 2013 we used administrative data
from NVRB to compile a list of 420 salaried workers receiving salary deposits into an NVRB
account. We contacted and enrolled these workers between April and September 2013. The
baseline followed in September-October 2013, before SSP was marketed to the treatment
group. During November 2013, we conducted the randomization and enrolled interested
treatment group clients in SSP. The first three follow-up surveys took place while SSP was
ongoing – during June 2014, October 2014, and February 2014 (months 6, 10, and 14 of the
commitment cycle). SSP savings were released in June 2015. The last two follow-ups took
place between September-November 2014 (months 3 and 5 after the SSP payout). The key
follow-up survey modules included savings, debt, expenditures, and assets. We collected
18The districts are Kratchi East, Biakoye, Jasikan, Kadjebi, and Nkwanta South.
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data on income by source in the baseline and fourth follow-up. The baseline collected
additional detail on respondents’ demographic characteristics. Selected follow-up survey
rounds also asked about economic shocks, financial well-being, intra-household decision-
making, and (unincentivized) time preferences. The final follow-up also asked respondents
about perceived benefits of SSP and interest in signing up for future SSP cycles.
A.3 Attrition
Study attrition was very low, with 91 percent of the sample interviewed in each survey round.
Appendix Table A2 formally verifies that attrition is uncorrelated with treatment status –
here, we see that treatment-control differences in attrition are small in magnitude and almost
never statistically significant, for both heavy and light overdrafters.
A.4 Summary of Key Variables
This subsection summarizes some of the key outcome variables in the study, and provides
additional detail on how we constructed them. All variables that were winsorized were done
so by survey round/month.
Administrative Data
• Account in Overdraft – A dummy variable equal to one in months where an individual
paid for an overdraft form or paid overdraft interest. Equal to one if an overdraft is
taken on any NVRB account.
• Overdraft Charges – Charges associated with issuance of an overdraft or overdraft
interest. Sums across all NVRB accounts.
• Net Deposits – Total monthly deposits less total monthly debits (including withdrawals
and fees), summed across all NVRB accounts. Total monthly deposits and withdrawals
are each winsorized at the 99th percentile before taking the difference.
• Average Daily Balance – The average daily balance across all NVRB accounts. Ac-
counts in overdraft are included with a negative balance. Winsorized at the first and
99th percentile.
• NVRB Savings at Survey Date – Total balance across all accounts on date of survey.
Accounts with negative balances (e.g. due to an overdraft) are coded to zero before
summing. Winsorized at the 99th percentile.
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• Salary Deposited into NVRB Accounts – Monthly salary deposits made into NVRB
accounts, based on account narration text. Winsorized at the 99th percentile.
Survey Data
• NVRB Savings – Respondent self-reported NVRB balances. In the survey, respondents
were asked to report non-SSP balances. SSP balances were added on top of this amount
based on administrative data. Winsorized at the 99th percentile.
• Other Formal Savings – Includes self-reported savings at other banks, microfinance
institutions, and credit unions. Winsorized at the 99th percentile.
• Informal Savings – Includes self-reported savings in cash and in savings clubs. Addi-
tional categories covered varied from survey round to survey round. At baseline, this
measure also includes savings in agricultural co-ops, savings held by other individuals
and susu collectors, and moneylenders. Follow-ups 1, 2, and 3 include mobile money
savings and “other informal cash savings”, which was collected in a free answer format.
This mostly includes money hidden at home and money stored with other individu-
als. Follow ups 4 and 5 includes the same categories as follow ups 1-3, but explicitly
prompted respondents to report savings held with other individuals including friends
and relatives. Winsorized at the 99th percentile.
• Total Savings – Sum of (winsorized) self-reported NVRB savings, other formal savings,
and informal savings.
• Took Any New Debt – Dummy variable equal to one if individual reported taking on
any new debt in the past 30 days.
• Debt with NVRB – Self-reported debt held at NVRB. Winsorized at the 99th percentile.
• Other Formal Debt – At baseline includes self-reported debt held at other banks, credit
unions, and microfinance organizations. Measures for all follow up surveys include these
categories as well as insurance companies and the teachers fund. Winsorized at the
99th percentile.
• Informal Debt – At baseline includes self-reported debt with individual and group
susus. Follow-up surveys include this, as well as other debt (collected in a free form
answer) from informal sources, such as shop keepers, traders, and individuals. Win-
sorized at the 99th percentile.
• Total Debt – Sum of (winsorized) debt with NVRB, other formal, and informal debt.
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• Savings Net Debt – Difference between total savings and total debt, both as defined
above.
• Child Missed Class for Unpaid School Fees – Dummy variable equal to one if a child
missed school because the respondent was not able to pay their school fees. The way
this variable is constructed varies from round to round. At the baseline, the variable
is equal to one if the respondent reports that children have to miss school “often” or
“sometimes” due to missed school payments. lookback period on this question varied.
In the first, second, and third follow up, the dummy is equal to one if a child missed
school due to a late payment in the past 30 days. Follow up 4 asked respondents to
report on the period between SSP release (June 1, 2015) and the survey and follow up
5 asked about the past 60 days.
• Concerned About Paying Bills – Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent re-
ported not having enough money to pay normal monthly expenses. The construction
is similar to the “missed school” variable, in that the baseline dummy identifies individ-
uals who report concern often or sometimes, while the follow ups identify respondents
who report actual difficulty. The follow up look back periods are the same as they are
for the missed school variable.
• Concerned About Repaying Debt – Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent
reported not having enough money to service scheduled debt payments. The construc-
tion is similar to the “missed school” variable, in that the baseline dummy identifies
individuals who report concern often or sometimes, while the follow ups identify re-
spondents who report actual difficulty. The follow up look back periods are the same
as they are for the missed school variable.
• Experienced Food Insecurity – Dummy to identify any kind of food insecurity. Equal
to one if respondent reports days when there was not enough food to meet the needs
of the family or days when adults cut or skipped meals because there was not enough
food rarely, sometimes, or often. The lookback period varied by survey round: it was
12 months at baseline, 30 days for follow ups 1-3, since June 1 2015 for follow up 4,
and 60 days for follow up 5.
• Personal Consumption – Respondent’s spending on his/her self (excludes household
expenses such as rent, utilities and food). The lookback period was 30 days for follow
ups 1-3, since June 1 2015 for follow up 4, and 60 days for follow up 5. Values are
re-normalized to correspond to a 30 day window for each survey round. Winsorized at
the 99th percentile.
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• Expenditure on Household and Others – Respondent’s spending on the household and
dependents (includes expenses such as rent, utilities, food, and education). The look-
back period was 30 days for follow ups 1-3, since June 1 2015 for follow up 4, and 60
days for follow up 5. Values are re-normalized to correspond to a 30 day window for
each survey round. Winsorized at the 99th percentile.
• Expenditure on Investments – Respondent’s spending on investments. The lookback
period was 30 days for follow ups 1-3, since June 1 2015 for follow up 4, and 60 days
for follow up 5. Values are re-normalized to correspond to a 30 day window for each
survey round. Winsorized at the 99th percentile.
• Monthly Salary and Wages – Income in the past month from salaried and wage jobs.
Winsorized at the 99th percentile. Note that income modules were only administered
at baseline and at follow up survey 4.
• Monthly Self-Employment Income – Income in the past month from self employment.
Winsorized at the 99th percentile. Note that income modules were only administered
at baseline and at follow up survey 4.
• Total Monthly Income – Sum of salary/wage and self employment income as defined
above. Note that income modules were only administered at baseline and at follow up
survey 4.
• SSP Reduces Transfer Pressure in Household – Dummy variable equal to one if respon-
dent strongly agrees that SSP makes it easier to say no to requests for money within
the household.
• SSP Reduces Transfer Pressure Outside Household – Dummy variable equal to one if
respondent strongly agrees that SSP makes it easier to say no to requests for money
coming from outside the household.
• SSP Helps Meet Savings Goals – Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent
strongly agrees that SSP makes it easier to meet savings goals.
• SSP Helps Gather Money for Large Expense – Dummy variable equal to one if the re-
spondent strongly agrees that SSP makes it easier to gather money for a large expense.
• SSP Helps Build Funds for Emergency – Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent
strongly agrees that SSP makes the respondent more likely to have funds available in
case of an emergency.
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Table A1: Demographic Characteristics and Randomization Verification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Whole Sample Heavy Overdrafters Light Overdrafters
Control
Mean
Treat-Control
Difference N
Control
Mean
Treat-Control
Difference N
Control
Mean
Treat-Control
Difference N
Fraction Months in Overdraft: Past Year 0.286 0.0209 318 0.525 0.0274 158 0.0475 0.0204 160
[0.319] (0.0362) [0.274] (0.043) [0.121] (0.0222)
Female 0.234 0.00332 318 0.165 0.0127 158 0.304 -.0075 160
[0.425] (0.0478) [0.373] (0.0603) [0.463] (0.0729)
Age 47.3 0.965 318 50.1 -.0633 158 44.5 2.04 160
[8.98] (0.979) [7.04] (1.12) [9.84] (1.52)
Teacher 0.563 0.0117 318 0.684 -.0253 158 0.443 0.0508 160
[0.498] (0.0557) [0.468] (0.0752) [0.5] (0.0793)
Other Govt. Employee 0.335 0.00206 318 0.316 0.0127 158 0.354 -.00875 160
[0.474] (0.0532) [0.468] (0.0749) [0.481] (0.0759)
Formal Private Sector Worker 0.101 -.00752 318 0 0.0127 158 0.203 -.0297 160
[0.303] (0.0334) [0] (0.0127) [0.404] (0.0621)
Education: Secondary Graduate 0.304 0.0275 318 0.304 -.0253 158 0.304 0.0789 160
[0.461] (0.0523) [0.463] (0.0727) [0.463] (0.0753)
Education: Postsecondary 0.665 -.0583 318 0.671 -.0127 158 0.658 -.103 160
[0.474] (0.054) [0.473] (0.0756) [0.477] (0.0773)
Married 0.861 0.0267 318 0.886 0.0253 158 0.835 0.0288 160
[0.347] (0.0373) [0.32] (0.0483) [0.373] (0.0568)
Biological Children Ever Born 3.84 -.0793 318 4.51 -.0759 158 3.18 -.0661 160
[2.34] (0.262) [2.39] (0.379) [2.1] (0.334)
Householders 14 and Under 2.2 -.159 318 2.23 -.291 158 2.16 -.0288 160
[1.78] (0.19) [1.73] (0.262) [1.84] (0.276)
Householders 15 and Older 3.78 0.128 318 4.16 0.0506 158 3.39 0.213 160
[2.27] (0.24) [2.28] (0.348) [2.21] (0.324)
Income Last Month 770 -67.1 302 746 -3.33 148 794 -128∗∗ 154
[421] (45) [425] (68.1) [419] (59.4)
Savings - NVRB (Reported) 249 -33.2 283 125 26.3 139 368 -89.5 144
[528] (60.3) [330] (59.1) [645] (102)
Savings - NVRB (Adminstrative) 243 -14.9 318 106 14.4 158 380 -46.8 160
[614] (64.9) [411] (61.7) [743] (111)
Total Cash Savings 1628 -315 249 1314 -83.3 124 1937 -543 125
[3269] (357) [1825] (423) [4231] (572)
Total Debt 2506 82.3 308 3127 111 152 1886 86.7 156
[2877] (336) [3108] (535) [2495] (390)
Economic Shock 0.468 0.0629 318 0.494 0.0506 158 0.443 0.0755 160
[0.501] (0.0561) [0.503] (0.0799) [0.5] (0.0793)
Financial Strain: Missed School 0.342 -.0605 318 0.329 -.038 158 0.354 -.0828 160
[0.476] (0.052) [0.473] (0.074) [0.481] (0.0735)
Financial Strain: Pay Bills 0.709 0.0474 318 0.747 0.0886 158 0.671 0.00813 160
[0.456] (0.0497) [0.438] (0.0647) [0.473] (0.0745)
Financial Strain: Pay Debt 0.589 0.0426 318 0.633 0.0506 158 0.544 0.0359 160
[0.494] (0.0548) [0.485] (0.0758) [0.501] (0.0789)
Socially Taxed 0.614 -.0202 318 0.557 0.0633 158 0.671 -.103 160
[0.488] (0.055) [0.5] (0.0786) [0.473] (0.0768)
Any Food Insecurity 0.456 0.0318 318 0.481 0.038 158 0.43 0.0264 160
[0.5] (0.0561) [0.503] (0.08) [0.498] (0.079)
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables denominated in Ghanaian Cedis top-coded
at the 99th percentile. In 2013 GHS 2.15 ≈ USD 1. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table A2: Tests for Differential Attrition by Treatment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Whole Sample Heavy Overdrafters Non-Heavy Overdrafters
Control
Mean
Treat-Control
Difference N
Control
Mean
Treat-Control
Difference N
Control
Mean
Treat-Control
Difference N
In Baseline 0.994 0.0000781 320 0.988 0 160 1 0 160
[0.0793] (0.00884) [0.112] (0.0177) [0] (0)
In Endline 1 0.962 0.00668 320 0.975 0 160 0.949 0.0136 160
[0.191] (0.0204) [0.157] (0.0248) [0.221] (0.0326)
In Endline 2 0.962 -.00574 320 0.975 -.025 160 0.949 0.0136 160
[0.191] (0.0221) [0.157] (0.0302) [0.221] (0.0326)
In Endline 3 0.937 0.0194 320 0.95 0 160 0.924 0.0389 160
[0.244] (0.0252) [0.219] (0.0347) [0.267] (0.0367)
In Endline 4 0.943 0.0255 320 0.95 0 160 0.937 0.0509∗ 160
[0.232] (0.0229) [0.219] (0.0347) [0.245] (0.0302)
In Endline 5 0.943 0.00691 320 0.95 -.0125 160 0.937 0.0263 160
[0.232] (0.0252) [0.219] (0.0366) [0.245] (0.0347)
In All Survey Rounds 0.906 0.00738 320 0.913 -.0125 160 0.899 0.0272 160
[0.293] (0.0322) [0.284] (0.0464) [0.304] (0.045)
Notes: Standard deviations in brackets, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, ***
p≤ 0.10.
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Table A3: Predictors of SSP Take Up and Drop Out
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pairwise Joint
Take Up Drop Out Take Up Drop Out
Heavy Overdrafter 0.005 0.124∗∗ -0.001 0.063
(0.072) (0.063) (0.082) (0.072)
Female 0.024 -0.078 0.090 0.003
(0.083) (0.062) (0.090) (0.071)
Age 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002 0.016∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
Teacher -0.054 0.093 -0.361∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.072) (0.061) (0.132) (0.141)
Other Govt. Employee 0.033 -0.085 -0.337∗∗ -0.043
(0.075) (0.060) (0.154) (0.153)
Education: Secondary Graduate -0.003 -0.038 -0.176 0.049
(0.076) (0.064) (0.158) (0.078)
Education: Postsecondary -0.019 0.072 -0.181 -0.014
(0.073) (0.061) (0.196) (0.135)
Married 0.059 0.053 0.118 0.014
(0.118) (0.087) (0.135) (0.107)
Biological Children Ever Born 0.038∗∗ 0.024 -0.002 0.022
(0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
Householders 14 and Under 0.039∗ -0.009 0.042 -0.026
(0.022) (0.021) (0.027) (0.025)
Householders 15 and Older 0.014 0.024 0.001 0.009
(0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024)
Income Last Month / 1000 0.065 0.223∗∗ 0.143 0.100
(0.103) (0.105) (0.149) (0.121)
Total Cash Savings / 1000 0.002 -0.012∗ -0.010 -0.013
(0.014) (0.007) (0.017) (0.009)
Total Debt / 1000 -0.007 0.035∗∗ -0.005 0.022
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018)
Economic Shock 0.023 -0.003 0.043 0.004
(0.072) (0.064) (0.080) (0.082)
Financial Strain: Missed School 0.113 0.012 0.157∗ 0.009
(0.074) (0.069) (0.084) (0.079)
Financial Strain: Pay Bills 0.103 -0.191∗∗ 0.188∗ -0.187∗
(0.087) (0.096) (0.098) (0.107)
Financial Strain: Pay Debt -0.123∗ -0.031 -0.161∗ -0.006
(0.071) (0.066) (0.088) (0.075)
Socially Taxed 0.019 0.072 0.036 0.098
(0.073) (0.061) (0.075) (0.068)
Any Food Insecurity -0.077 0.003 -0.065 0.019
(0.071) (0.064) (0.078) (0.072)
DV Mean 0.719 0.130 0.719 0.130
N 160 115 160 115
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. The first two columns
show results of pairwise regressions (each cell represents a separate regression). The last
two columns show results from regressions where all demographic variables are jointly
included as covariates. All variables denominated in Ghanaian Cedis top-coded at the
99th percentile. In 2013 GHS 2.15 ≈ USD 1. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table A4: Impacts on Debt by Source
(1) (2) (3)
Debt
With
NVRB
Other
Formal
Debt
Informal
Debt
Treatment × During 29.6 240.6 5.68
(174.6) (216.4) (5.97)
Treatment × After -153.5 338.5 0.96
(157.1) (225.6) (8.81)
Control Mean (During) 1563.7 1490.6 10.6
Control Mean (After) 1471.6 1150.1 15
N 1520 1527 1528
Baseline Control? Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions include strata fixed effects, time period fixed
effects, and the baseline outcome of the dependent variable whenever
possible. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in
parentheses. All variables in Ghanain Cedis top coded at the 99th
percentile. In 2013 GHS 2.15 ≈ USD 1. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, ***
p≤ 0.10.
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Table A5: Impacts on Financial Strain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Child
Missed
Class for
Unpaid
School Fees
Concerned
About
Paying Bills
Concerned
About
Repaying
Debt
Experienced
Food
Insecurity
Treatment × During -0.012 0.050 0.020 -0.019
(0.034) (0.037) (0.032) (0.038)
Treatment × After 0.021 0.0084 0.030 -0.0015
(0.037) (0.044) (0.038) (0.041)
Control Mean (During) 0.27 0.49 0.22 0.40
Control Mean (After) 0.21 0.35 0.22 0.28
N 1516 1510 1497 1528
Baseline Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions include strata fixed effects, time period fixed effects, and the baseline
outcome of the dependent variable whenever possible. Robust standard errors clustered at
the individual level in parentheses. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table A6: Impacts on NVRB Account Use, Administrative Data - Heterogeneity by Baseline
Overdraft Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acct. in
Over-
draft
Overdraft
Charges
Net
Deposits
Average
Daily
Balance
Treatment × During × Light Overdrafter 0.018 0.62 35.7∗∗∗ 339.0∗∗∗
(0.019) (1.06) (12.5) (66.9)
Treatment × Endline × Light Overdrafter -0.058∗ -3.85∗∗ -11.0 213.6∗∗
(0.029) (1.89) (44.8) (103.8)
Treatment × Post-Endline × Light Overdrafter -0.020 -1.19 89.5∗∗ 278.2∗∗
(0.029) (2.32) (35.1) (132.0)
Treatment × During × Heavy Overdrafter 0.0015 0.48 2.87 147.1∗∗∗
(0.036) (2.52) (10.2) (55.7)
Treatment × Endline × Heavy Overdrafter -0.062 -3.72 3.16 65.9
(0.057) (3.93) (28.0) (71.0)
Treatment × Post-Endline × Heavy Overdrafter 0.0078 0.089 -25.3 2.22
(0.052) (4.13) (29.3) (102.8)
P-value: Heavy=Light, During 0.691 0.959 0.044∗∗ 0.028∗∗
P-value: Heavy=Light, Endline 0.948 0.976 0.788 0.241
P-value: Heavy=Light, Post-Endline 0.643 0.788 0.012∗∗ 0.100
P-value: Treat=0, Light 0.030∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
P-value: Treat=0, Heavy 0.312 0.527 0.837 0.072∗
Control Mean (During, Light) 0.070 3.22 -20.1 263.0
Control Mean (Endline, Light) 0.12 6.57 3.56 322.3
Control Mean (Post-Endline, Light) 0.099 5.96 -13.9 288.9
Control Mean (During, Heavy) 0.54 29.3 -18.4 -85.0
Control Mean (Endline, Heavy) 0.54 30.0 0.42 -102.1
Control Mean (Post-Endline, Heavy) 0.43 29.0 51.5 -67.7
N 9540 9540 9540 9540
Baseline Control? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions control for strata and month fixed effects, interactions between overdrafter status
and period (endline, post-endline), and the average outcome in the year before the baseline survey.
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Data is at the person-month
level. Overdrafter is a dummy equal to one if the participant paid either overdraft interest or the fee
for an overdraft form in a given month. Monthly overdrafter charges topcoded at the 99th percentile,
average daily balance topcoded at the 1st and 99th percentile. Net deposit is the difference between total
deposits and withdrawals, both topcoded at the 99th percentile. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table A7: Impacts on Debt by Source - Heterogeneity by Baseline Over-
draft Behavior
(1) (2) (3)
Debt
With
NVRB
Other
Formal
Debt
Informal
Debt
Treatment × During × Light Overdrafter -38.4 135.8 -5.11
(269.8) (277.2) (7.82)
Treatment × After × Light Overdrafter -386.9 313.4 3.67
(234.6) (255.2) (14.2)
Treatment × During × Heavy Overdrafter 98.0 344.7 16.3∗
(219.6) (328.8) (9.03)
Treatment × After × Heavy Overdrafter 78.7 361.3 -1.81
(205.1) (372.4) (10.3)
P-value: Heavy=Light, During 0.694 0.626 0.075∗
P-value: Heavy=Light, After 0.135 0.915 0.755
P-value: Treat=0, Light 0.115 0.445 0.659
P-value: Treat=0, Heavy 0.883 0.500 0.176
Control Mean (During, Light) 1504.3 1021.6 17.6
Control Mean (After, Light) 1598.3 709.0 14.7
Control Mean (During, Heavy) 1621.1 1941.4 3.83
Control Mean (After, Heavy) 1348.2 1579.7 15.3
N 1520 1527 1528
Baseline Control? Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions include strata fixed effects, time period fixed effects, in-
teractions between overdrafter status and time period, and the baseline outcome
of the dependent variable whenever possible. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses. All variables in Ghanain Cedis top coded
at the 99th percentile. In 2013 GHS 2.15 ≈ USD 1. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, ***
p≤ 0.10.
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Table A8: Impacts on Expenditure and Income - Heterogeneity by Baseline Overdraft Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Expenditure Income
Personal
Con-
sumption
Spending
on House-
hold and
Others
Expenditure
on Invest-
ments
Salary
and
Wages
Self Em-
ployment
Total
Treatment × During × Light Overdrafter -11.2 0.65 -24.8
(18.4) (83.4) (42.7)
Treatment × After × Light Overdrafter -2.12 -102.5 0.93 114.3∗∗ 29.8 161.9∗∗
(13.6) (80.7) (43.1) (55.2) (27.3) (66.3)
Treatment × During × Heavy Overdrafter 31.9 144.2 7.65
(20.1) (100.8) (36.4)
Treatment × After × Heavy Overdrafter -0.48 93.8 -1.36 4.81 23.3 27.5
(12.7) (79.6) (38.5) (81.8) (28.8) (83.1)
P-value: Heavy=Light, During 0.115 0.273 0.563
P-value: Heavy=Light, After 0.930 0.084∗ 0.968 0.270 0.867 0.206
P-value: Treat=0, Light 0.831 0.311 0.818 0.039∗∗ 0.276 0.015∗∗
P-value: Treat=0, Heavy 0.262 0.294 0.973 0.953 0.420 0.740
Control Mean (During, Light) 139.2 789.9 155.2
Control Mean (After, Light) 81.8 732.0 106.3 712.8 54.1 766.9
Control Mean (During, Heavy) 128.9 842.2 128.5
Control Mean (After, Heavy) 83.4 658.4 87.0 843.7 32.3 876.0
N 1528 1528 1528 306 306 306
Baseline Control? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All regressions include strata fixed effects, time period fixed effects, interactions between overdrafter status and time
period, and the baseline outcome of the dependent variable whenever possible. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual
level in parentheses. All variables in Ghanain Cedis top coded at the 99th percentile. In 2013 GHS 2.15 ≈ USD 1. Survey data
on income only available at baseline and in follow up survey 4. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table A9: Impacts on Overall Cash Savings by Baseline Other Control
Savings Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Savings
at NVRB
(Admin)
Savings
at NVRB
(Survey)
Other
Formal
Savings
Informal
Savings
Total
Savings
Took Any
New Debt Total Debt
Savings
Net Debt
Treatment × During 320.669∗∗∗ 307.723∗∗∗ -70.619 -33.662 178.277 0.057 11.572 173.230
(65.958) (67.313) (160.979) (26.211) (187.036) (0.038) (356.207) (404.700)
Treatment × During × Other Control -24.511 -20.091 77.412 21.291 89.924 0.033 526.606 -465.372
(76.088) (77.384) (181.515) (30.331) (207.053) (0.045) (415.209) (459.911)
Treatment × After 215.657∗∗ 127.123 145.120 -74.361 168.866 0.054 -59.809 304.677
(87.049) (84.844) (183.638) (51.846) (215.301) (0.043) (347.078) (407.878)
Treatment × After × Other Control -210.609∗∗ -160.434∗ 4.668 130.586∗∗ -9.620 -0.009 472.037 -523.364
(90.014) (86.444) (220.950) (64.381) (250.668) (0.047) (399.027) (466.946)
P-Val, During=0, Other Control Problem 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.963 0.654 0.110 0.011∗∗ 0.121 0.477
P-Val, After=0, Other Control Problem 0.923 0.493 0.402 0.335 0.439 0.218 0.205 0.607
DV Mean (Control, No Problem) 185.542 242.651 1212.544 204.877 1662.356 0.165 2792.135 -1073.859
DV Mean (Control, Other Control Problem) 175.536 226.206 803.076 195.684 1238.958 0.172 2969.259 -1770.425
N 1519 1490 1509 1518 1479 1519 1510 1472
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. All regressions control for the baseline value of the outcome, strata fixed
effects, time period fixed effects, an other control dummy, and interactions between the other control dummy and time period. The other control dummy is
equal to one if the respondent reports difficulty saving no to transfer requests from others at baseline. All variables in Ghanain Cedis top coded at the 99th
percentile. In 2013 GHS 2.15 ≈ USD 1. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, *** p≤ 0.10.
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Table A10: Does Experience Impact Respondents’ Assessments of SSP?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reduce
Transfer
Pressure in
Household
Reduce
Transfer
Pressure
Outside
Household
Helps Me
Meet
Savings
Goals
Helps Me
Gather
Money for a
Big Expense
Helps Build
Funds for an
Emergency
Panel A. Overall Impacts
Treatment 0.13∗∗∗ 0.039 0.14∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.076
(0.047) (0.046) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
Control Mean (After)XXXXXXXXXXXX 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.24
Panel B. Impacts by Baseline Overdraft Behavior
Treatment × Light Overdrafter 0.17∗∗∗ 0.047 0.15∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.052
(0.064) (0.070) (0.071) (0.074) (0.068)
Treatment × Heavy Overdrafter 0.085 0.030 0.14∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.099
(0.069) (0.059) (0.073) (0.072) (0.078)
P-value: Non-OD=OD 0.386 0.855 0.922 0.214 0.651
Control Mean (After)XXXXXXXXXXXX
Control Mean (After, Non-OD) 0.12 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.20
Control Mean (After, OD) 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.16 0.28
N 303 303 303 303 303
Baseline Control? No No No No No
Notes: All regressions control for strata fixed effects and the baseline outcome of the dependent variable whenever possible.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for strata fixed effects. * p≤ 0.10, ** p≤ 0.05, ***
p≤ 0.10.
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Figure A1: Administrative Data – Overdrafts in Year Before Experiment
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Note: Dashed lines mark median values.
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Figure A2: Study Timeline
Listing of 
target 
population 
using admin 
data 
Baseline  
survey 
Random- 
ization 
 
Beginning of 
SSP 
contributions 
 
April 2013 
Enrollment of eligible salaried 
workers 
Sept. - Oct. 
2013 
 
Nov. 2013 
Endline 1 
 
Dec. 2013 
 
June 2014 
             
Endline 2 
 
Oct. 2014 
             
Endline 3 
 
Feb. 2015 
             
End of 
intervention 
 
May 2015 
             
SSP 
Payout 
 
June 
2015 
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Sept.- 
Oct. 2015 
             
Endline 5 
Nov. 2015         
Last 
extraction of 
account data 
 
May 2016 
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new savings 
account for 
payout 
 
Intervention (18 months) 
Note: Activities took place in sequential order from left to right.  
Notes: Activities took place in sequential order from left to right.
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